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Tort - Res ipsa loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur simply means that the thing speaks for itself. In instances where the courts apply the principle, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The maxim is normally applied in instances where the cause of the damage, injury or illness is unknown and it is up to defendant to rebut the presumption that he or she had caused the accident, injury or illness. In Mahon v Osborne (1931) a patient died shortly after a surgery and the post mortem revealed that the surgeon who had conducted the surgery had negligently left a cotton swab in the patient’s body. The court held that there was no need to look any further and that the cotton swab was sufficient prove that the defendant had been negligent and had breached his duty of care i.e. the thing (the cotton swab) speaks for itself (res ipsa loquitur). The fact that the cotton swab was present in the body of the deceased was sufficient evidence that the defendant was guilty and the court need not look any further to i

Tort - Novus Actus Interveniens

Novus Actus Interveniens in tort is an intervening act that causes a break in the chain of causation and negates the defendant’s liability. A defendant is liable in tort when his action or inactions (omissions) cause some form of physical injury, psychiatric illness, or some type of damage to property. The injury, illness, or damage is normally the direct consequence of the defendant’s action or inactions (omissions). Causation is a chain i.e. an action or an inaction (omission) that leads to a result, often dire but nonetheless foreseeable and the defendant is often liable unless there is a break in the chain and a new, often independent act, causes a break in the chain. In the Oropesa (1943) there was a collision at sea between two ships. The Oropesa collided with another vessel, the Manchester Regiment and the vessel, the Manchester Regiment sustained serious damage. The captain of the Manchester Regiment ordered the crew to abandon ship. The captain having transferred 50

Tort - Ex Turpi Causa

Ex turpi causa non oritur actio or ex turpi causa for short simply means that when the plaintiff has committed an illegal act, he cannot claim a legal remedy i.e. where the act is illegal a legal remedy is not available. Another way of looking at it is that no man should be allowed to profit from his crime. In Ashton and Turner (1981) the plaintiff was a passenger in a car that the defendant was driving. The pair had jointly committed a burglary and the defendant was drunk at the time. The car they were driving in subsequently crashed and the plaintiff sued. The court held that the principle of ex turpi causa prevented him from claiming. In Meah v McCreamer (No. 1) (1985) the plaintiff suffered severe head injuries as a result of a road accident caused by the plaintiff’s negligence that subsequently resulted in a change of personality. He became a sexual predator and was eventually convicted of sexually assaulting two women and causing injury to a third. The plaintiff sued t

Tort - Contributory negligence V

In Green v Gaymer (1999) the plaintiff got on the back of a motorbike with the defendant who was drunk at the time on the throttle. The motorbike subsequently crashed into a lamppost and in the accident that followed, the defendant was killed while the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued. It is worth comparing the facts of Green v Gaymer (1999) with that of Pitt v Hunt (1990). There, the defendant aged 16 gave the plaintiff aged 18 a ride on his motorbike. The defendant neither had insurance nor had he paid road tax and he was on a bike with a much bigger engine than someone his age was allowed to be on. In addition to that both the plaintiff and the defendant were drunk and witnesses gave evidence that they were riding recklessly on the road at the time. There was an accident and the defendant was killed while the plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Whereas in Pitt v Hunt (1990) the maxim of ex turpi causa prevented a duty of care from arising the court in Green

Tort-Contributory negligence IV

In Fitzgerald v Lane (1987) the plaintiff was walking down a pelican crossing when the light for pedestrians turned red. He was hit by the first defendant’s car and thrown on to the path of the second defendant’s car. The plaintiff suffered severe injuries especially to the neck resulting in partial tetraplegia. Because it was impossible to determine which of the defendants caused the injury an action was brought against both defendants. It was held that because it was impossible to determine which of the defendants had caused the injury, the defendants were jointly liable. The damages were however reduced by 1/3 in line with s1 (1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. In Capps v Miller (1989) the plaintiff, a motorcyclist, was in the middle of the road, on his bike, waiting to make a right turn. He was waiting for the right time to make the turn when the defendant, who was drunk at the time, crashed into him with his car from the rear. The plaintiff was inj

Tort-Contributory negligence III

In Froom v Butcher (1975) the plaintiff was involved in a car accident which was caused by the defendant’s negligence. While the defendant was held liable, the claimant was not wearing her seat belt at that time of the accident. The law that made the wearing of seatbelts mandatory only came into force on the 31st of January 1983 - prior to that it was recommended that passengers in a car wear seatbelts. Fitting of seatbelt anchorage points in all new cars was made compulsory in 1967. Therefore it is possible to surmise that the government was quite serious about making the public aware of the benefits of wearing seatbelts and it was only a matter of time before the law came into effect. It was held that the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the defendants negligence but the plaintiff also had a duty to take the necessary precautions to mitigate or reduce any injury he or she may incur by taking recommended precautionary steps and therefore the damages that the p

Tort-Contributory negligence II

In Sayers v Harlow UDC (1958) the plaintiff used one of the public toilets provided by the defendants. When she tried to leave the cubicle, she realized that the door was without a knob or a handle or the knob or the handle had become undone. She tried fidgeting with the door and when that was unsuccessful she tried climbing out the window by standing on a toilet roll holder which gave way and the plaintiff was injured as a result. The plaintiff sued. The court held that it was reasonable to expect that doors in public toilets would open both ways and the means to open the doors would always be readily available. It was also foreseeable that if someone was trapped in a public toilet they’d try, in some way or other, to get out and the longer a person is stuck or trapped in the toilet the more frantic or desperate he or she would become. The plaintiff was successful and the council was held to be liable. The plaintiff’s damages were however reduced because the court found tha

Tort - Contributory negligence I

S.1(1) of the (Law Reform) Contributory Negligence Act gives us the scope of contributory negligence as defined by law – Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: Provided that— (a) this subsection shall not operate to defeat any defense arising under a contract; (b) where any contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability is applicable to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant by virtue of this subsection shall not exceed the maximum limit so applicable. Contributory negligence is a defense i.e. when a defendant is adjudged to be negligent for

Tort XXXV - Remoteness IV

In McGhee v National Coal Board (1972) the plaintiff worked in the defendants’ brick factory and though in the initial stages he was exposed to only small quantities of dust he was later asked to work in brick kilns and was exposed to hot abrasive dust. The defendants did not have adequate washing facilities available and the plaintiff had to cycle home, after at least eight hours of toiling in the brick kilns, to have a wash. As a result, the plaintiff contracted dermatitis and he sued. The court held that the defendants had breached their duty by failing to provide adequate washing and cleaning facilities and it does not matter that there may have been other factors that could have or may have impacted the onset of the illness. The prime factor or the major factor that had caused the plaintiff’s illness was the defendants negligence and therefore the defendants were liable. In Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (2000) the plaintiff worked as a marine fitter and during the cour

Tort XXXIV - Remoteness III

In Crossley v Rawlinson (1981) we once again examine the duty that is owed to a rescuer. The defendant was driving a lorry and while he was on the road a tarpaulin on the back of the lorry caught fire. At the time, the defendant was about 100 meters away from an AA station and an AA patrolman caught sight of the fire. The patrolman grabbed a fire extinguisher and rushed to the rescue but he stepped in a pothole and fell and as a result sustained injuries. The plaintiff sued. The court held that while it was foreseeable that the fire would prompt a rescuer to come to the aid of the defendant it was unforeseeable that the rescuer would step in a pothole, trip, fall and sustain some form of injury. The court held that the damage was too remote and the plaintiff was unable to claim. Would the plaintiff have been successful if he’d brought an action against the council whose duty it was to maintain the roads instead of the defendant? As per the decisions in Stovin v Wise (1996) a