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Tort - Contributory negligence I

S.1(1) of the (Law Reform) Contributory Negligence Act gives us the scope of contributory negligence as defined by law – Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: Provided that— (a) this subsection shall not operate to defeat any defense arising under a contract; (b) where any contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability is applicable to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant by virtue of this subsection shall not exceed the maximum limit so applicable. Contributory negligence is a defense i.e. when a defendant is adjudged to be negligent for

Tort XXXV - Remoteness IV

In McGhee v National Coal Board (1972) the plaintiff worked in the defendants’ brick factory and though in the initial stages he was exposed to only small quantities of dust he was later asked to work in brick kilns and was exposed to hot abrasive dust. The defendants did not have adequate washing facilities available and the plaintiff had to cycle home, after at least eight hours of toiling in the brick kilns, to have a wash. As a result, the plaintiff contracted dermatitis and he sued. The court held that the defendants had breached their duty by failing to provide adequate washing and cleaning facilities and it does not matter that there may have been other factors that could have or may have impacted the onset of the illness. The prime factor or the major factor that had caused the plaintiff’s illness was the defendants negligence and therefore the defendants were liable. In Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (2000) the plaintiff worked as a marine fitter and during the cour

Tort XXXIV - Remoteness III

In Crossley v Rawlinson (1981) we once again examine the duty that is owed to a rescuer. The defendant was driving a lorry and while he was on the road a tarpaulin on the back of the lorry caught fire. At the time, the defendant was about 100 meters away from an AA station and an AA patrolman caught sight of the fire. The patrolman grabbed a fire extinguisher and rushed to the rescue but he stepped in a pothole and fell and as a result sustained injuries. The plaintiff sued. The court held that while it was foreseeable that the fire would prompt a rescuer to come to the aid of the defendant it was unforeseeable that the rescuer would step in a pothole, trip, fall and sustain some form of injury. The court held that the damage was too remote and the plaintiff was unable to claim. Would the plaintiff have been successful if he’d brought an action against the council whose duty it was to maintain the roads instead of the defendant? As per the decisions in Stovin v Wise (1996) a

Tort XXXIII - Remoteness II

In Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company (1964) the plaintiff was a worker in a factory who was standing too close to a cauldron. A piece of asbestos accidentally fell into the cauldron that was filled with molten liquid and the subsequent reaction, of the asbestos coming in contact with the molten liquid, resulted in an explosion and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued. The duty that was owed to the plaintiff was a duty that was owed by an employer to an employee and an employer had to take reasonable care and caution to ensure that the environment that the employee was working in was safe. In this instance, at the time of the accident, it was unknown, within the industry at least, that asbestos coming in contact with molten liquid would result in an explosion. The court held that the injury was too remote because the defendant could not have foreseen that the accident would produce the result that it did. In order to establish that the damage was not too remote,

Tort XXXII - Remoteness I

Once the elements of duty, breach and causation are satisfied, the plaintiff has to establish that the type of damage that was incurred was foreseeable i.e. the damage was not too remote and it was the type of damage that a reasonable man would have in his contemplation or the type of damage that is the natural consequence of the defendant’s negligence. The test for remoteness in tort is the same as the test for remoteness in contract. In Re Polemis (1921) (Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. (1921)) one of the men employed to load and unload cargo from a ship dropped a plank into the ship’s cargo hold and the plank struck a flint which caused a spark that came in contact with petrol fumes and the resulting fire spread to the hull of the ship and set the whole ship on fire. The court had to decide as to the extent of the defendant’s liability. It was held that the defendant was not only liable for the damages that he could foresee but was also liable for all th

Tort XXXI - Causation XVII

In AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust (2004) three families brought an action for the removal of tissue and organs from the bodies of their deceased children without first obtaining the consent of the parents against the relevant authority. The tissue and the organs were removed after a post mortem and the parents only became aware of the details many years later. The parents sued. The court held that the removal of tissue and organs from the bodies of the children without informing the parents first or without obtaining their consent violated the duty health care professionals owed to parents. In Barber v Somerset County Council (2004) an aging teacher, aged 52 at the time, was employed by a school. The teacher was over burdened by the duties that were given to him and despite repeatedly requesting that the workload be shared, the school did not make the effort to delegate some of the teacher’s duties and as a result the teacher suffered from a breakdown and other relat

Tort XXX - Causation XVI

In Donachie v The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police (2004) the plaintiff was an undercover police officer and he was assigned to attach a monitoring device on a car. The car was parked behind a public house and the device failed to transmit any signals the first time it was attached. The plaintiff subsequently had to try 9 times before he could get the device to work properly and each time he tried, the pressure kept mounting and he grew more and more weary, to the extent that he feared increasingly for his life with each step that he took. As a result of the stress that he was exposed to he developed a stress related illness and later had a stroke due to the illness. The plaintiff sued and he was successful. The court in line with the decision in Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (1996) did not distinguish between an illness and a physical injury. It was sufficient that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care (similar to a duty of care o