The Blip Blop Blog (Team Entity)

It’s normally difficult to convict a doctor for involuntary manslaughter and in most instances all the doctor has to do is to established that he or she was acting in a manner that was reasonable or in a manner that is accepted by some recognized school of medicine. The law without doubt favors medical practitioners and that is because doctors need some degree of flexibility and they may not be able to perform their duties efficiently if they were constantly afraid of being sued and therefore to be successful in a case against a doctor the defense not only has to establish that the doctor’s actions were out of the norm but was off the mark by some degree. That exception however does not apply to nurses and those that administer anesthetics. In R v Bateman (1925) a doctor was charged with manslaughter for causing the death of a woman in his care who died during childbirth. It was held that in order for the doctor to be convicted of manslaughter the scope of negligence or the neg

If the accident or the mishap that deprived the victim of his or her life was caused by the victim then the accused would not be found to be guilty of manslaughter. Let’s say for example that a driver gives someone he or she knows a lift in his or her car and the passenger for some reason or other interferes with the steering wheel and that in turn causes an accident and the passenger who interfered with the steering wheel dies as a result of the accident. In such an instance the driver would not be found guilty of manslaughter. In R v Jones (1870) the accused was the driver of a horse drawn cart and while he was driving the passenger decided to tamper with the horses while the horses were pulling the cart and as a result the driver lost control of the cart and an accident ensued and the passenger died. The accused was charged with reckless manslaughter but was subsequently acquitted on the grounds that the accident was caused by the inappropriate act of the passenger and n

In R v Swindall and Osborne (1846) the accused was driving his cart down a street, racing with another driver, the winner being the driver of the cart that reached the intended destination first. While they were racing one of the carts ran over a pedestrian who was killed in the accident that followed. The accused was arrested and charged with reckless manslaughter. The accused was convicted. An accused however would not be convicted of manslaughter if he or she can prove or the defense can establish that even if the accused had not been careless or negligent, death would have been the end result anyway. In R v Dalloway (1847) the accused, the driver of a horse drawn cart was driving his cart down a road when a child suddenly ran out in front of the cart and was hit by it. The accused was not holding the reins at the time the cart was travelling down the street and as a result deprived himself of the means of preventing or stopping an accident. The accused was charged in co

Involuntary manslaughter occurs when death results from the overtly negligent or careless act of the accused i.e. the accused kills another without the intention to kill or lacks the mens rea for murder i.e. premeditation or intent and it normally occurs when death results from an act that is callous and reckless. In R v Walker (1824) the accused was driving his horse drawn cart down a street recklessly calling out to the pedestrians as he did so to get out of the way. The cart ran over a passerby, who died as a result and the accused was arrested and tried. Because the accused lacked the mens rea to kill, his act though careless and reckless was not done with the intent to kill and therefore lacked the prerequisite for murder. The accused was convicted of manslaughter instead. Similarly, in R v Martin (1827) where the accused had given a child a wrong drink or a drink that was not suitable for the child, as a result of which, the child died, the accused was convicted o

In R v Hendy (2006) the accused a 16-year-old had without doubt some sort of mental impairment as a result of a head injury that he suffered from as a child. He was callous and reckless and gave little thought to his own safety and at times had endangered his own life. On the night of the incident the accused had been drinking heavily and had attempted to take his own life but he was stopped by friends. That night once he’d returned home, still drunk, he walked out into an alley with a knife and stabbed a man to death. The accused was arrested. At the trial it was held that the accused did not have to show that the mental impairment would have caused him to kill, under the circumstances, as per R v Egan and the court followed the decision in R v Dietschmann (2003). In addition to that if the accused satisfies the conditions of S. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 the verdict that would be returned is that of manslaughter. When it comes to diminished responsibility the more bizarr

In R v Ahluwalia (1993), the accused was constantly abused by her husband. The type of abuse included beating her daily and taking her money. In addition to that he was also having an affair with another woman. On the night of the incident, after subjecting his wife to verbal abuse, the accused threatened to beat her up the following morning. Once the victim was asleep the accused doused her husband with petrol and set him alight. She was arrested and tried for murder. She raised the defense of provocation but the defense of provocation in line with the decision in R v Duffy (1949) was denied. The accused was convicted for murder and the accused appealed raising the defense of diminished responsibility. The appeal was allowed on the grounds of diminished responsibility however the judge did stress that under normal circumstances both defenses should be raised in the first instance otherwise the defense might exhaust one defense before attempting another. It was decided that the

Diminished responsibility and insanity are not the same thing see R v Rose (1961) (Privy Council). In R v Seers, the accused suffered from chronic depression and stabbed his wife. The accused was charged with murder and at the trial the judge directed the jury that they should only find the accused guilty of manslaughter if his depression bordered on insanity. The accused appealed on the grounds that the judge had erred in his direction and the court in line with R v Byrne (1960) held that in order for the defense of diminished responsibility to be raised the accused had to establish abnormality of mind as per S.2 of the Homicide Act (1957). The accused was found to be guilty of manslaughter. It is normally a good idea to produce medical evidence when raising the defense of diminished responsibility and while the jury may refuse to take into account or consider the medical evidence, they can do so if they find that the medical evidence has been tampered with see Walton v The Qu

Earlier on we had said that excessive drinking or consumption of alcohol alone while it may impair the accused’s ability to think and reason clearly will not fall under the category of diminished responsibility but what if the accused suffers from depression and commits murder while he or she was drunk or after he or she had been drinking excessively? In R v Fenton (1975), the accused after he’d been drinking heavily shot a policeman and drove off in his car to a club where he shot and killed more people, 3 more to be precise. The accused was charged with murder and raised the defense of diminished responsibility. Under S. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 excessive drinking will only be a defense if “it either causes damage to the brain or produces an irresistible craving so that consumption is involuntary”. In situations where the consumption of alcohol will not give rise to a defense but the defendant suffers from some type of mental impairment the court will ignore or set

In R v Lloyd (1966) the accused strangled his wife. The accused was arrested and charged. At the trial, the defense brought to light the fact that the accused suffered from a mental abnormality but there was no evidence to indicate that the mental abnormality that he suffered from would impair his ability to reason. The trial judge directed the jury to the effect that they should decide based on the evidence that was presented to them if the mental abnormality constituted substantial impairment or otherwise. If the jury found that that the mental impairment was substantial then they should convict for manslaughter, otherwise they should convict for murder. The jury convicted for murder and the accused appealed on the grounds that “abnormality of mental functioning” as per S. 2 (1) of the Homicide Act (1957) meant that the mental impairment should be more than trivial and not substantial in the ordinary sense of the word. His appeal was based on the premise that the level of

The defense of diminished responsibility is raised when an accused is tried for murder and the defense puts forward the argument that at the time the accused committed the act he or she had lost, albeit temporarily, his or her ability to think and reason. It could either be due to a permanent illness see R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) or it could be due to an illness that makes itself obvious or apparent in temporary fits and seizures see R v Campbell (1997). In R v Dunbar (1958) the accused entered a room occupied by an 84-year-old lady while she was sleeping to steal some money. The lady woke up and the accused fearing that the lady would recognize him picked up a bottle of lemonade that was close by and hit her with it and the injuries that she sustained subsequently led to her death. The accused was tried and convicted for murder. At the trial, the accused raised the defense of diminished responsibility and he appealed on the grounds that the trial judge had misdirected the