Tort XXIII - Causation IX
In
John Munroe (Acrylics) Ltd v London Fire and Civil Defense Authority (1997) the
fire brigade was called in to put out a fire on an adjoining property. The
firemen inspected the area and once they’d finished, they left the scene
believing that the fire had been put out but failed to take note of some
soldering debris. Once they had left, the fire started again and spread to the
plaintiff’s property and caused damaged to his property. The plaintiff sued but
was unsuccessful.
The
court held that there was no duty owed. The standard of care that is imposed on
the fire brigade is similar to that which is owed by the police and applying
the principle in Hill v Chief Constable of Yorkshire (1989) the court found
that imposing a duty under the circumstances would impede the fire brigade and
would not allow them to carry out their duties efficiently. It would lead to
defensive firefighting in that firemen would be more concerned or may become
preoccupied with the liabilities that may be imposed on them rather than firefighting.
McFarlane
v EE Caledonia Ltd (1997) allows us to further examine the duty that is owed to
a rescuer. It concerns the Piper Alpha disaster which is the worst offshore oil
rig disaster to date. In a space of 2 hours 167 men lost their lives while 61
others survived by jumping into the sea from the helicopter platform.
The
plaintiff was employed to work on the oil rig (Piper Alpha) but at the time of
the accident he was onboard another vessel which was anchored close by. The
vessel, the plaintiff was on, went to help with the rescuing operations and the
plaintiff was clearly able to see everything that transpired. He was certainly
close enough.
The
plaintiff claimed that he had succumbed to a psychiatric illness after
witnessing the disaster and its aftermath. The court held that the plaintiff
could not recover for psychiatric illness because he wasn’t in any danger.
Let’s
compare the decision in McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd (1997) with the decision
in Chadwick v British Railways Board (1967); in the latter (Chadwick v British
Railways Board (1967)) the plaintiff was at the scene of the incident. In the
former (McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd (1997)) the plaintiff, while he could
witness the incident, was a safe distance away. We have to keep in mind that the
duty that we are referring to here is that which is owed to a rescuer and not
that which is owed to someone who witnessed the aftermath of an accident or an
innocent bystander like in the case of Bourhill v Young (1943) and the series
of cases that followed it. With regards to a rescuer it would be safe to say
that in order for the courts to impose a duty the rescuer must be at the scene
of the accident or the incident.
In
Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority (1998) the plaintiff was
detained in a mental hospital prior to release and soon after his release the
plaintiff stabbed a man to death and was convicted for manslaughter. The
plaintiff brought an action against the defendants claiming that he shouldn’t
have been released from a mental hospital and it was his release that had
provoked the stabbing and as a consequence he was now incarcerated and
therefore he should be compensated accordingly by the defendants for
negligently releasing him.
The
plaintiff was unsuccessful and the principle of ex turpi causa was applied i.e.
– where the act is illegal, a legal remedy is not available.
In
Harris v Evans (1998), the plaintiffs were operating a bungee jump, which was
quite popular at the time. The participations stood on a platform which was
lifted by a crane to a certain height often above a river with their feet bound
and attached to a bungee rope. Once the platform was in place, the participants
would walk off the platform and fall straight into the river.
A
health and safety inspector inspected the jump and came to the conclusion that
it was unsafe and thereby instructed the operators to terminate all future
jumps. The operators, the plaintiffs, sued for loss of income.
The
plaintiffs were unsuccessful. The plaintiff was suing for pure economic loss. In
line with the decision in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin (1972) and
Caparo v Dickman (1990) the courts are reluctant to allow damages for pure
economic loss.
Furthermore,
in Harris v Evans (1998) the defendant was merely doing his duty as he was employed
to do and he was empowered to do so by statute. Therefore, there should be no
liability imposed on the defendant.
Copyright
© 2019 by Dyarne Ward
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