S.18 and S.20 of the Offences Against Person Act (1861) (Summary)
The
offences of wounding and causing GBH (grievous bodily harm) are to be
found in S. 18 and S. 20 of the Offences Against Person Act (1861). The
sections read as follow: –
S.
18 “Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or
cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, . . . with intent, . .
. to do some . . . grievous bodily harm to any person, or with
intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person,
shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable . .
. to be kept in penal servitude for life . . .”
S.
20 “Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous
bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or
instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall
be liable . . . to be kept in penal servitude . . .”
Between
the two, S. 20 is the lesser offence and S. 18 is the more serious offence and
an offender if convicted under S. 18 can be kept in prison for life.
The
mens rea (mental element) to obtain a conviction under S. 20 is as follows: –
1. Intention
2. Recklessness
The
test to obtain a conviction under S. 20 of the Offences against Person Act
(1861) is subjective see R v Savage (1991).
In
R v Savage (1991) the defendant threw a glass of beer at her husband’s
ex-girlfriend, but the glass slipped from her hand and resulted in serious
injury to the victim. The defendant was tried and convicted for maliciously
causing grievous bodily harm to another under S. 20 of the Offences Against the
Person Act (1861). The victim appealed on the grounds that the word malicious
required intent and the defendant had not intended to cause the victim the kind
of harm or injury that resulted from her actions.
The
trial judge had failed to inform the jury that the test to convict under S. 20
of the Offences Against the Person Act (1861) was subjective and the jury had
to establish intent before it could convict under S. 20. However, given the
facts it was possible to convict under S. 47 of the Offences Against the Person
Act (1861), if the defendant could foresee that some harm would result from her
actions albeit not the exact type of harm or injury that resulted. The matter
was referred to the House of Lords.
The
matter before the House of Lords was whether: –
1. It
was possible to substitute a S. 20 conviction for a S. 47 conviction when there
was no intent, or the subjective test was not satisfied? The answer is yes, and
it is possible to substitute a S. 20 conviction with a s.47 conviction on a
count of causing grievous bodily harm (GBH) when the element of intent cannot
be satisfied.
2. A
conviction under S. 47 simply required Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) i.e. minor
injuries, bruises, cuts and wounds and proof of an assault. Silence can
constitute an assault see R v Ireland (1997) and recognized psychiatric
illnesses are also classed or categorized as physical injury see R v Ireland
and Burstow (1997).
3. In
order to convict under S. 20 the defendant must foresee the consequences of his
or her actions regardless of the severity of the harm or injury that resulted.
In
R v Parmenter (1991) the defendant was convicted on four counts of causing
grievous bodily harm to his infant son. The types of injuries included bruises,
broken bones and aberrations. The judge directed the jury to convict under S.
20 of the Offences Against Person Act (1861) if they believed that the
defendant ought to be aware (objective) or should be aware that his actions
would cause his infant son some form of injury. The jury convicted, and the
defendant appealed on the grounds that in order to convict under S. 20 the
defendant must have foresight of the consequences (subjective) or must be aware
that his actions would harm his son (subjective).
The
defendant’s argument was that he did not know that the manner in which he
handled his son would cause him physical injury or was unable to appreciate
that his manner of handling his son would cause him physical injury.
The
court held that the test to convict under S. 20 of the Offences Against the
Person Act (1861) was subjective i.e. the defendant must be able to foresee the
consequences of his actions and substituted the conviction for a conviction
under S. 47 of the Offences Against Person Act 1861 (a lesser offence) where it
sufficed that the defendant foresaw or could anticipate some form of harm.
The
mens rea (mental element) to convict under S. 18 of the Offences Against Person
Act is as follows: –
1.
Intention to cause GBH (grievous bodily harm)
and/or
2.
With intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any
person.
s.18
convictions are reserved for more severe or serious offences which is made
evident by the penalty that is imposed.
The
test to determine intention is provided in Section 8 of the Criminal Justice
Act (1967) – proof of criminal intent. A court or jury, in determining whether
a person has committed an offence –
(a)
shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those
actions; but
(b)
shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all
the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the
circumstances.
In
order to obtain a conviction under S. 20, the prosecution needs to satisfy the
four components that make up the actus rues (physical element). They are as
follows:
1.
The act must be unlawful
2.
Wounding
or
3.
Inflicting/Causing grievous bodily harm (GBH)
4.
On another person.
1.
The unlawful act:- In
Fagan v MPC (1969) the defendant was in his car when he was approached by a
police officer who told him to move his vehicle. The defendant did so and
reversed his car onto the foot of the police officer. The police officer
somewhat forcefully told the defendant to move the car off his foot and the
defendant swore at the police officer, switched off the engine and refused to
do so. The defendant was tried and convicted for assault and appealed the
decision. The appeal was dismissed.
With
reference to children any punishment that is imposed must only be to the extent
that it is reasonable and anything beyond that may lead to criminal charges.
In
R v Hopley (1860) the defendant was a schoolmaster who was charged with causing
the death of one his pupils which was brought about or precipitated by
excessive punishment.
It
was held that a parent or a guardian may punish a child provided that it
doesn’t go too far and it is done with the intention of correcting the child
and not for the gratification of passion or rage
S.
58 of the Childrens Act 2004 elaborates further on the subject-
Reasonable
punishment
(1)
In relation to any offence specified in subsection (2), battery of a child
cannot be justified on the ground that it constituted reasonable punishment.
(2)
The offences referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a)
An offence under section 18 or 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861
(wounding and causing grievous bodily harm);
(b)
An offence under section 47 of that Act (assault occasioning actual bodily
harm);
(c)
An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty
to persons under 16).
(3)
Battery of a child causing actual bodily harm to the child cannot be justified
in any civil proceedings on the ground that it constituted reasonable
punishment.
(4)
For the purposes of subsection (3) “actual bodily harm” has the same meaning as
it has for the purposes of section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act
1861.
(5)
In section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, omit subsection (7).
Section
1 (1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 reads as follows:-
If
any person who has attained the age of sixteen years and has
responsibility for any child or young person under that age, willfully
assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or exposes him, or causes or procures
him to be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner
likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health (including injury
to or loss of sight, or hearing, or limb, or organ of the body, and any mental
derangement), that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be
liable—
(a)
On conviction on indictment, to a fine . . . or alternatively . . . or in
addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years;
(b)
On summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £400 pounds, or
alternatively . . . or in addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not
exceeding six months.
2.
Wounding is defined as a break in the skin. In Moriarty v Brookes (1834) a
publican tried to evict a customer who was causing a disturbance and refused to
leave. The publican put his arm around the man’s shoulders and tried to evict
the man and in doing so injured him below the eye (there was a cut in the skin
which resulted in bleeding).
‘If
the violence which occurred took place in an endeavor by the defendant to turn
the plaintiff out of the house, the third plea is proved. However, this plea
does not profess to justify any wounding; therefore, if there was a wound, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover for that. It is proved that the plaintiff was
cut under the eye, and that it bled; and I am of opinion that, that is a
wound.’
The
publican was found guilty and was deemed to have used too much force or
excessive force.
If
there is no break in the skin for example there is only a rapture of internal
blood vessels, then as far as s. 18 of the Offences Against Person Act (1861)
is concerned, it will not amount to or be classed or categorized as a wounding.
In
JJC v Eisenhower (1984) the defendant, a minor, fired multiple rounds with an air-gun
at a group of people and another minor in the group sustained injuries when he
was hit by a pellet from the air-gun in the face and it caused the blood
vessels below the surface of the skin to rupture. The defendant was charged
under s.18 of the Offences Against Person Act (1861) and the question before
the court was whether a s. 18 wounding requires a break in the skin.
The
court decided that a conviction under s.18 of the Offences Against Person Act
(1861) requires actual wounding i.e. a break in the continuity of the skin and
even a scratch, for that matter, would not suffice.
Likewise
a defendant cannot be found guilty of causing or precipitating a psychiatric
illness under s. 18, because while psychiatric illnesses are recognized as
physical injuries there is no break in the continuity of the skin but the
defendant can be convicted under s. 47 of the Offences Against Person Act 1861
see R v Ireland (1998).
3.
Grievous Bodily Harm. Grievous bodily harm is defined as serious harm to
another person or harm that is above or more serious than actual bodily harm
(ABH).
In
DPP v Smith (1961) – Smith had stolen some goods and loaded it to the back of
his car. A policeman ordered him to stop but he drove off instead and the
policeman jumped on to the back of the car in order to stop him. The policeman
was subsequently throw off from the back of the vehicle, into the path of other
oncoming vehicles and died as a result. The defendant was tried and convicted.
The defendant appealed.
The
House of Lords unanimously upheld the conviction. In doing what he (Smith) did,
he must, as a reasonable man have contemplated that serious harm was likely to
occur. Hence, he is guilty of murder.
The
test in DPP v Smith (1961) is as follows: – If the jury is satisfied that he (Smith)
must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm (GBH) was
likely to have resulted to the policeman from his actions and such harm did in
actual fact occur, then the accused is guilty of murder. On the other hand, if
the jury is satisfied that he (Smith) could not have contemplated that the
policeman would incur grievous bodily harm (GBH) as a result of his actions
then the verdict would be guilty of manslaughter.
The
test in DPP v Smith (1961) was supplanted by Section 8 of the Criminal Justice
Act (1967) – Proof of criminal intent.
A
court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence –
(a)
shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those
actions; but
(b)
shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all
the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the
circumstances.
When
assessing whether the injuries amounted to GBH or otherwise the jury is
entitled to take into account the characteristics peculiar to the victim
including his or her age. In R v Bollom (2004) the defendant inflicted
injuries on his partner’s seventeen-month old baby and while the injuries would
not have constituted grievous bodily harm (GBH) if inflicted on an adult, the
same injuries when inflicted on a child could constitute grievous bodily harm
(GBH). The jury took into account of the fact that the victim was a baby and
convicted the defendant for causing grievous bodily harm (GBH).
The
defendant appealed on the grounds that when deciding whether any injury
(injuries) constituted grievous bodily harm (GBH), the jury should not take
into account the age and characteristics of the victim.
The
court of appeal held that when deciding whether an injury (injuries) amounts to
grievous bodily harm (GBH) the jury is entitled to take in account the victim’s
age, sensitivities, and characteristics. However, because not all the injuries
that were sustained by the victim were a result of the defendant’s actions the
conviction was substituted for a S. 47 conviction or actual bodily harm (ABH).
It is possible to substitute a S. 20 conviction with a S. 47 conviction see R v
Savage (1991) and R v Parmenter (1991). The test to determine whether a
defendant is guilty of a S. 47 offence is objective.
It
also worth keeping in mind S. 58 (4) of the Childrens Act 2004 – For the
purposes of subsection (3) “actual bodily harm” has the same meaning as it has
for the purposes of section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861”.
S.
58 (3) of the act reads as follows: –
“Battery
of a child causing actual bodily harm to the child cannot be justified in any
civil proceedings on the grounds that it constituted reasonable punishment”.
When
assessing the nature of the injury (injuries) the jury is to take into account
all factors and whether the injury (injuries) amount to GBH or otherwise is to
be determined by taking into account ordinary standards of usage and experience
and this direction is in line with Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act
(1967).
In
R v Brown and Stratton (1997) the defendant and his cousin were
embarrassed by the defendant’s father who was undergoing a gender reassignment
and turned up at the defendant’s workplace wearing a dress. Both the defendant
and his cousin after a drinking bout, went over to the where the defendant’s
father was staying, and assaulted her inflicting numerous injuries including a
broken nose, a concussion and knocked out several teeth. The defendants
pleaded guilty to causing actual bodily harm as per S. 47 of the Offences Against
Persons Act (1861) and not grievous bodily harm (GBH) as per S. 18 of the
Offences Against Person Act (1861).
The
trial judge directed the jury to consider the injuries from the perspective of
the victim and if the victim would consider the injuries that she’d sustained
as serious and the defendants were accordingly convicted for causing grievous
bodily harm (GBH) under S. 18 of the Offences Against Persons Act (1861). The
defendants appealed.
It
was held that while there was a mis-direction (the direction to the jury), it
did not by itself render the conviction unsound. Taking into account the
fact that the defendants were intoxicated at the time the S. 18 conviction was
substituted for a S. 20 conviction of the same act.
Grievous
Bodily Harm includes psychiatric illnesses. However an action for causing a
psychiatric illness is best brought under S. 20 of the Offences Against Person
Act (1861) because a S. 18 conviction of the same act requires a break in the
continuity of the skin see JJC v Eisenhower (1984).
In
R v Ireland and Burstow (1998) the defendant and the victim were in a brief
relationship which the victim unexpectedly ended. Unhappy with the victim’s
decision, the defendant harassed the victim for several months making repeated
phone calls, sending her threatening letters, turning up unexpectedly and
speaking to her neighbors. The defendant’s actions caused the victim to succumb
to a psychiatric illness (severe depression).
It
was decided that: –
1. Words
are sufficient to constitute an assault. In fact, silence alone for example in
instances where the caller calls the victim and remains silent can constitute
an assault – the proposition … that words cannot suffice is unrealistic and
indefensible. With reference to phone calls – that fact that the caller calls
and remains silent to cause fear and intimidation is sufficient to constitute
an assault – Lord Steyn see R v Ireland (1998)
2. Psychiatric
illness (injury) does fall under the scope of bodily harm or can be classified
or categorized as bodily harm (whether it is actual bodily harm or grievous
bodily harm most likely depends on the severity of the offence, keeping in mind
that it is possible to substitute a S. 20 conviction for a S. 47 conviction)
3. Inflict
– the word inflict includes both direct and indirect harm and it could either
be intentional or due to the defendant’s recklessness. In R v Martin (1881) the
defendant shut the doors at a theater and placed a crossbar across the door. He
then switched off the lights on a staircase and yelled “fire”. His actions
caused a panic and some of those that were in attendance were injured when they
rushed out.
It
was held that the defendant, regardless of the fact that he was merely playing
a prank, must be deemed to have intended the consequences of his actions and he
was found guilty accordingly.
In
R v Wilson (1984) the defendant hit a pedestrian (the victim) with his
vehicle and a heated argument subsequently ensued during the course of which
the defendant punched the victim.
It
was held that ‘grievous bodily harm may be inflicted, either where the accused
has directly and violently ‘inflicted’ it by assaulting the victim, or where
the accused has ‘inflicted’ it by doing something, intentionally, which, though
it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, it
does directly result in force being directly applied violently to the body of
the victim so that he suffers grievous bodily harm’
With
regards or reference to psychiatric illnesses, inflict is construed as causing
or precipitating the illness and does not require proof of assault or battery
and nor does it require direct or indirect force. The defendant’s persistent
and often repeated actions can be construed as inflicting, when the psychiatric
illness does occur.
In
R v Burstow (1997) the defendant and the victim were in a brief relationship
which the victim unexpectedly ended. Unhappy with the victim’s decision, the
defendant harassed the victim for several months making repeated phone calls,
sending her threatening letters, turning up unexpectedly and speaking to her
neighbors. The defendant’s actions caused the victim to succumb to a
psychiatric illness (severe depression).
The
questions before the courts were as follows: –
1. Are
words alone sufficient to constitute an assault and
2. Does
psychiatric illness (injury) fall within the scope of S. 18, S. 20 and S. 47 of
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and can it be defined as bodily harm.
It
was decided that on: –
1. Words
are sufficient to constitute an assault.
2. Psychiatric
illness (injury) does fall under the scope of bodily harm or can be classified
or categorized as bodily harm.
Copyright
© 2019 by Dyarne Jessica Ward
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