The Blip Blop Blog (Team Entity)

With regards to alcoholism, in order for it to be defense or to be considered or regarded as a defense, the disease must rob the victim of the ability to resist. If the defendant still retains the ability to resist than the taking of the intoxicant would be deemed voluntary and the rules with regards to self-intoxication would apply. The impairment caused by repeated drinking must be so substantive that it has robbed the defendant of the ability to reason and has caused “gross impairment to her judgement and emotion responses” – Watkins LJ. Whether the alcoholism has deprived the defendant of the ability to reason or has caused gross impairment to her judgement and emotion responses, will depend on the medical evidence that is produced during the trial. In R v Tandy (1989) the accused strangled her 11-year-old daughter to death after she complained to the accused that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather. The accused had been drinking heavily just prior to the

With regards to specific intent crimes for example murder, self-intoxication is a defense or more rightly a mitigating factor, but one the court will allow only sparingly i.e. the court, or the jury will look into all the evidence that is available to them as per s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act (1967) and decide if the defense should be made available to the defendant or if the court will accept the defendant’s plea and the reluctance of the court is primarily because of public interest or public policy reasons in that an innocent member of the public should be protected from the drunken mistake of another especially given the fact that the defendant got drunk on his own accord. It might be different if the defendant had been forced to drink or someone had pointed a gun to the defendant’s head and made him drink or if his drink was spiked but unless that was the case, the courts will show some reluctance in allowing the defense. In R v Stubbs (1989) the defendant who was dru

If the defendant makes a mistake as to the potency or the strength of the drugs or alcoholic beverage he has taken or consumed, and then commits a crime and seeks to rely on intoxication, the defense will not be made available to him and the fact that he was intoxicated will not reduce the severity of the crime or the offence. The rules with regards to self-intoxication will apply as they are. In R v Allen (1988) the defendant drank some home-made wine, and the drink was stronger than normal or the alcoholic content in the drink was higher than normal. The defendant in his intoxicated state committed sexual assault and during the trial sought to rely on the defense of intoxication. It was held that regardless of the strength of the drink or the fact that the defendant had made a mistake as to its potency, the consumption of the drink was still voluntary and thus the defense of intoxication would not avail itself to him especially in light of the fact that sexual assault is a

Intoxication is not available as a defense when the defendant makes a mistake in instances of self-intoxication. Prior to reaching a verdict the jury will take into account all the evidence that is made available to them as per Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act (1967). In R v O’Grady (1987) the appellant and the victim were friends and they had spent the day, in the company of another friend, drinking. Between them they had consumed eight flagons of cider after which they retired to the appellant’s home. According to the appellant he was woken up by the victim and the appellant in self-defense picked up some broken glass and started hitting the victim over the head. Once the fight had subsisted, they patched things up and he cooked both his friends a meal and the three of them then went to bed. The defendant and the other friend woke up the next morning to find the victim dead in bed, he had died as a result of blood loss and further investigation revealed that the v

A year later in R v Hardie (1984) another exception was added, in that, while intoxication was not a defense to basic intent crimes, it is a mitigating factor when the drugs that were taken were merely soporific or sedative. It is to some extent possible to say that intoxication is not a defense to basic intent crimes or crimes where the mens rea to obtain a conviction are negligence and recklessness only with regards to offences that are committed after the defendant had been drinking or drinking excessively or after taking illegal drugs or dangerous drugs. In R v Hardie (1984) the defendant who was distressed after he’d broken up with his partner and was asked to leave the flat, took some out of date valium tablets that were not prescribed to him, and returned later and set fire to a wardrobe in his bedroom. The defendant was charged under s.1(2) and s.1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act (1971) which reads as follows: - s.1(2) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or dam

With regards to the rule that intoxication is not a defense or is not a mitigating factor in basic intent crimes, there may be an exception when the acts of the defendant are a result or resulted from automatism, i.e. automatism is an exception to the rule that intoxication does not mitigate or reduce the severity of a basic intent crime. However, if there is intent, or the prosecution can establish intention, bearing in mind that the burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the defense would not avail itself to the defendant. In R v Bailey (1983) the defendant a diabetic went over to the house of his ex-lover’s new partner (victim), clearly upset over the fact that his ex-girlfriend had moved on. The victim invited the defendant in to discuss the matter, and the defendant who had taken his insulin but had not consumed any food, prior to the visit, felt that he was going into hypoglycemic, a state caused by a lack of glucose in the body and asked the victim for a glass of sug

If the defendant makes a mistake with regards to damage to property that a normal person who was not under the influence of drinks or drugs would have made, then regardless of the fact that the defendant was intoxicated, the defense of mistaken belief will be made available to the defendant as per s.5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The section and subsection read as follows: - s.5(2) A person charged with an offence to which this section applies, shall, whether or not he would be treated for the purposes of this Act as having a lawful excuse apart from this subsection, be treated for those purposes as having a lawful excuse— (a) If at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction of or damage to the property in question had so consented, or would have so consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances

In 1977 as per the decision in DPP v Majewski (1977) it was decided that intoxication is not a defense when the crime that is committed is a basic intent crime. A basic intent crime is a crime where the mens rea is usually recklessness or negligence or where the defendant has not given any thought to the consequences of his actions or having given it some thought has dismissed it. In DPP v Majewski (1977) the defendant was involved in a brawl in a pub during the course of which, he assaulted two customers, the publican, the arresting police officer and two more police officers at the station, including an inspector in his cell. The defendant argued that at the time he was severely intoxicated having been drinking and taking drugs and therefore he lacked the intention to commit the offences or did not intent to commit the offences i.e. he did not have the mens rea that was required for a conviction. In determining whether the defendant is guilty or otherwise, the court does n

If the defendant became intoxicated because of external factors or factors that were to some degree or extent beyond his or her control then that might be a mitigating factor that might reduce the severity of the crime for example in instances of automatism. There are two types of automatism:- Automatism that arises as a result of the defendant’s failure to do something or the defendant overdoing something that he is supposed to do. This type of automatism is considered or regarded as intoxication. 1.      Automatism that is precipitated by natural causes i.e. a sickness or an illness. This type of automatism is regarded as insanity. 2.      Automatism per se is the defendant’s inability to control himself or herself, and it works in the same manner that an impulse control disorder does. However, impulse control disorders are inherent conditions that exist throughout whereas automatism only arises at certain times and in most instances if the defendant takes his or her

In order to decide whether intoxication should avail itself to the defendant on otherwise the court or the jury should take into account all the evidence that is made available to them as per s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which reads as follows: - Proof of Criminal Intent A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence – (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances. In R v Lipman (1969) the accused was high on LSD and was hallucinating at the time. He was, as far as he was concerned, battling serpents somewhere and unwittingly stuffed bed sheets into the mouth of a little girl who died as a result. The accused was charged with murder

If the defendant either drinks (alcohol) or takes drugs to fortify his courage or to give him “dutch courage” then regardless of whether the crime that is committed is a basic intent crime or a specific intent crime he would not be able to rely on the fact that he was intoxicated at the time and did not have the mens rea to commit the crime as a mitigating factor to reduce the severity of the act. In Attorney-General of Northern Ireland v Gallagher (1961) the accused had a violent twist to his personality and often acted in a deranged manner, especially after he had consumed alcohol and was particularly violent towards his wife. The accused spent some time in a mental institution, for which he blamed his wife and upon release he made up his mind to kill her. However, in order to work himself into a fit or to have the courage to kill his wife, he drank down a bottle of whisky, and once he had reached the level of intoxication where he was deprived of his senses, he killed his

In DPP v Beard (1920) the defendant while he was drunk raped a 13-year-old girl and put his hands around her throat to stop her from screaming. The victim suffocated and died as a result. The defendant was charged. It was held that voluntary intoxication was never an excuse for criminal misconduct. A man who commits a crime by his own acts that destroy his will power or deprive him of the ability to reason is in no better position than a man who is sober. However, on a charge of murder, the jury cannot convict if they cannot establish the mens rea i.e. the intention to kill or the intention to cause grievous bodily harm or malice afterthought but can nonetheless convict for manslaughter. Murder is a specific intent crime (in most instances the mens rea for a specific intent crime is codified by statute) and in order to establish murder, the prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the elements that are required to obtain a conviction, but that does not mean that

Intoxication per se in not a defense in criminal law. It comes into play when the defendant commits an act under the influence of: - 1.      Alcohol 2.      Drugs However, without doubt, depending on the level of intoxication, it can deprive the defendant of the ability to reason. A man who is intoxicated is in no position to make sound or reasonable judgement and hence it can deprive the defendant of the mens rea (mental element) necessary for a conviction. It can be said with some degree of certainty that when the defendant commits an act, under the influence, while the actus reus may be there (physical element), the mens rea (mental element) may not be present. The law has to strike a balance between convicting a defendant who does not have the mens rea or intention to commit a crime and protecting the general public from criminal acts. If intoxication were a valid defense than anyone who wanted to commit a crime, would simply do so under the influence and w

S.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008, does not change the law on self-defense or its application and merely codifies the principles that have been established at common law. In R v McGrath (2010) the defendant and the victim were out drinking celebrating their "A" levels results and later they moved on to the defendant’s flat. The celebrations turned sour and an argument ensued. The argument got heated and according to the defendant the victim attacked her physically, spit at her and bit her and the defendant grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed the victim. The knife went through the victim’s heart and he died. The defendant was arrested and tried and at her trial, she claimed, self-defense or that she was merely reacting, instinctively, to the attack. The trial judge directed the jury on mistaken belief and on s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008 and the jury found the defendant not guilty on the count of murder but guilty in

The defense of self-defense will not avail itself to the defendant if the defendant is the aggressor or has provoked the response or the attack. In R v Keene (2010) the defendant was out drinking. At his last stop, he met the victim who offered to give him a lift. On their way home the victim pulled over to get some petrol and the defendant got into an argument with another passenger in the car, who was smoking, telling her not to smoke. The argument got heated and the victim intervened. The defendant thought that the victim was about to attack and preemptively struck the victim, hitting him with a closed fist. The victim fell to the ground and his head hit the pavement resulting in serious head injuries. The defendant was charged and he contended that his actions were in self-defense. The trial judge directed the jury to the effect that the defense of self-defense will not avail itself to the defendant if the defendant was the aggressor or he provoked the attack and

If the defendant suffered from an abnormality of the mind, and reacted to a situation in the way and manner a normal person would not have or had used excessive force in defending himself or his property, keeping in mind that the defendant’s actions when acting in self-defense is normally instinctive, and all that the defendant needs to establish is that he or she felt that at the time his or her actions were honestly and instinctively necessary to defend himself or herself, the defense of self-defense may not avail itself to the victim, if the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. In R v Martin (2002) the defendant lived by himself in an isolated farmhouse which for all purposes looked rundown and to some extent dilapidated and had in the past been subjected to numerous break-ins. On the night in question the victim and his friend tried to break into the farmhouse and the defendant went downstairs armed with a shotgun a

By virtue of S.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 the common law defense of self-defense was given statutory effect (an act of parliament is higher than common law and in case of conflict between the two, an act of parliament or statutory law will prevail). S.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 reads as follows: - Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc. (1) This section applies where in proceedings for an offence— (a) an issue arises as to whether a person charged with the offence (“D”) is entitled to rely on a defence within subsection (2), and (b)the question arises whether the degree of force used by D against a person (“V”) was reasonable in the circumstances. (2) The defenses are— (a) the common law defence of self-defence; and ((aa) the common law defence of defence of property; and) (b) the defences provided by section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (c. 58) or section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act (No

When the jury is convinced excessive force was used and the jury returns a verdict of guilty of murder, should the verdict be substituted for a verdict of guilty of manslaughter if the appellant was acting in self-defense? In R v Palmer (1971) the appellant and two others were chased by some men after they’d stolen some drugs. During the chase the appellant fired some shots and one of the men that was chasing them was killed by a gunshot. The appellant was arrested and tried and according to the appellant he did not fire the shot. The judge however directed the jury on self-defense and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder. The appellant appealed on the grounds that the judge having directed the jury on self-defense, the jury should have returned a verdict of manslaughter. The appeal was dismissed. If a verdict of murder is returned, when the appellant has pleaded self-defense there is no option to substitute a murder conviction with that of manslaughter. &quo